Abstract-In optical sensor networks, the adversary can inject false reports and old packets, both of which can cause false alarms and drain out the limited energy of the network. Existing security mechanisms can detect and filter out only false reports but not the old packets during forwarding. Analysis and simulation results show that MOFS can not only filter false reports and old packets simultaneously, but also performs well on compromise toleration.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Optical sensor networks (OSNs) are widely used in many important fields including military surveillance, habitat monitoring and health care [1] . The sensor nodes with limited resources are usually deployed in hostile environments. In such circumstances, the security of sensors is of essential importance. Once a node is compromised by the adversary, all the secret information would be disclosed and thus can be abused to launch false report injection attacks [2] , or replayed data injection attacks [3] , i.e., to inject outdated reports into sensor networks. Defending the aforementioned attacks in WSNs is very important, because these illegitimate data not only cause false alarms but also may drain out the constrained resources of the sensors.
In recent years, some researches focused on preventing such false data and replayed data injections [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . The feature of them is to attach t MACs (Message Authentication Codes) or time stamp to each report, and rely on intermediate nodes to verify the correctness. These schemes work well when only little compromised nodes existed in the network, while if more than t nodes are compromised, the attacker can then exploiting the fetched secrets to fake out unrealizable false data reports. Moreover, the attacker can also inject outdated data into the network without being detected en-route.
As illustrated in Fig. 1 , here we assume that the adversary has compromised five nodes A 1 , … , A 5 . When the security threshold is set to five and the attacker fake a false report R:(e, M 1 , M 2 , M 3 , M 4 , M 5 ), and then send it to the neighbor nodes, then R would not be filtered out. This is because all MACs included in the report are correct and thus cannot be detected. Moreover, if the attacker exploits the compromised node A 5 to inject the outdated report R 0 into the network, then the forwarding nodes are also not able to detect, which cause the waste of energy. In this paper, we presented a MAC and one-way function based filtering scheme named MOFS.
The sensors use the function to generate a one-way hash chain, and then transmit the neighbor information and initial hash value to some intermediate nodes. Each report should carry the ID, hash value and MAC of t nodes which sensing the event simultaneously. The forwarding nodes then verify the logicality of the sensors' locations, the correctness of MACs, and both the correctness and freshness of the hash value, and thus to filter out false data and outdated data simultaneously.
II. RELATED WORK
Ye et al. firstly discussed about the problem of false data filtering in the Optical sensor networks, and presented a mechanism called SEF [3] . SEF divide the overall key pool into n partitions, and every partition includes m secret keys. Every node chooses a partition before deployment randomly, and then selects arbitrary k keys from the partition to store. After detecting the event, multiple nodes detecting the event simultaneously generate a report including t different MACs collaboratively. In the process of transmitting the data package, the intermediate node which
owes the same key partition with the detection node can check up an MAC in the data package using a probability of k / m. All the false packages which sneak filtering would be filtered by sink finally. However, SEF has two severe problems. First, if a compromised node caches some legal data and injects a large number of copies into the network, then these copies would all be transmitted to sink, leading to a waste of energy. Second, if the attacker obtains t different key partitions arbitrarily, then he can fabricate false package which can't be distinguished.
Ma et al. put forward a sink verifying method, called REFE [4] . In the RSFS, all nodes and sink form the star topology, among which the cluster heads with stronger performance than the ordinary nodes gather data, and the gathering result should consist of all MACs produced by all detecting nodes. After accepting the gathering result, sink check the gathering result and the MACs, thereby filtering out the false data. This method isn't be restricted by safe threshold t, but false data can't be filtering out by transmitting nodes; therefore it isn't good for saving energy in the sensor network. In addition, some nodes dying or some new nodes joining the network would all lead to the change of the topology of the network, therefore the RSFS scheme, which only is suitable for the specific star topology, is not suitable for the actually deployed WSNs.
Yang et al. [5] proposed a statistical en-route filtering scheme based on multi-dimensional called MDSEF. Differ to the ordinary en-route filtering based on one dimension, the scheme divides an overall key pool into multiple sub-sets; each includes several key groups. After being deployed, each node can join a group in each set and randomly select some keys from these groups. This method can greatly improve the performance of covering probability and filtering effectiveness, without losing the resilience against nodes compromising. It then presented an axis-rotation based algorithm to associate multiple sets with the detecting terrain. Finally, a distributed stepwise refinement group joining algorithm is also applied for selecting groups. However, both the group joining algorithm and axis-rotation based algorithm lead to huge energy consumption for energy limited WSN.
Naresh et al. [6] pioneered an active filtering scheme for false data called AEFS to cope with false data injection attacks and DoS attacks simultaneously in WSN. Each node was firstly initialized with a hash chain. It then distributes its verifying key to some intermediate nodes.
After sending a data report, the sensing nodes all immediately disclose their keys, enabling the forwarding nodes to check the corresponding reports. The scheme uses a so-called Hill Climbing algorithm to distributing keys with which the nodes lies closer to the source possess stronger filtering capacity than others. Furthermore, AEFS utilizes the actual property of broadcasting in wireless communications to deal with DoS attacks. The scheme is able to identify and filter out false data earlier with a low requirement in memory and computing. However, the Hill Climbing method also incurs a huge communication cost.
Bashir et al. [7] researched on the duplicate data elimination problem in hybrid RFID-sensor networks named RDFS. They thought that RFID data includes much duplication. The transmitting of RFID data through multiple hops toward sink will lead to extra energy consumption which is unnecessary and thus decreasing the network's lifecycle. The proposed scheme used a clustering mechanism and authorized cluster heads to eliminate duplicate data and forward filtered data towards the sink node. As a result, it can eliminate duplicated data effectively. Theoretical analysis and simulations illustrate that RDFS outperforms existing enroute filtering schemes on both filtering efficiency and energy consumption, but the adapted time synchronization technique isn't appropriate for wireless sensor network with limited energy.
Yang et al. [6] presented an en-route filtering scheme based on polynomials named PCREF.
After deployed, all nodes in the scheme are grouped into some clusters. After that, according to a pre-defined probability, each of them is assigned an authenticated polynomial and a checking polynomial. The authenticated polynomial is used to endorse the report and the checking polynomial is for verifying the accepted report, respectively. Different initiative polynomials will be adopted in different clusters. Compared with the aforementioned schemes which use MACs to endorse reports, polynomials based technique enables PCREF to achieve a better filtering capability.
Yang et al. [10] thought that the symmetric key technique is not safe enough for WSN and firstly tried to adopting asymmetric key technique on filtering false reports. The proposed CCEF scheme is based on commutative cipher, in which the source node establishes a secret association with sink, while all intermediate nodes using the witness key to verify the data reports without having to know the original session key. CCEF achieves a stronger protection against symmetric key based schemes. Ren et al. [12] proposed a LEDS scheme which exploiting the location-aware character of sensor networks to protect the security of data in WSN. The location-aware end-toend security not only guarantees node-to-node verification through the package forwarding routes, but also can ensure an efficient en-route filtering capacity; however it is only suitable for some particular network routings.
To defending outdated data, Perrig et al. put forward the SNEP and µTESLA algorithms to check up outdated data in the SPINS protocol. µTESLA arithmetic assigns a hash function in advance for every node before deployment. Sink owes the whole information of all secrets. After detecting an event, the sensing nodes using the hash function to adores the sensing data, and send the result to the destination node. Both sides can update the counters and prepare transmission in the next time. Chen et al. proposed a scheme based on the time synchronization technique, TSPC [14] . Its basic ideology is that the side of sending inset time-poke information in every data package and sink distinguish outdated data through checking up the accuracy of time-poke.
Recent study indicates that the synchronization technique and public secret key technique have higher requirement on calculating and storage capability, and thus is difficult to apply to limitedperformance wireless sensor network directly [2, 3] . However, the symmetrical secret key technique has many advantages, such as easy realization and low calculation complexity. It is possible the only one technique of data encryption which can be applied to sensor networks.
Existing methods basing on technique of symmetrical secret key, such as SEF, RSF, MDSEF, RDFS, PCREF and so on, can't check up the freshness of the data, so they can't check outdated package which is sent by compromise panel point. The deal such as SPINS, TSPC and so on can't check up and filter the outdated package in the transmission. This article mainly discusses how to filter out the false package and outdated package in the sensor network at the same time.
III. THE MOFS SCHEME a. System model Assume the sensors are distributed in a high density, such that each stimulus can be sensed by more than t sensor nodes simultaneously. They elect one of the nodes as the Center-of-Stimulus (CoS) [3] in a collaborative manner. We also assume that all detecting nodes belong to the neighbors of the CoS. The CoS then gathers t MACs and summarizes them to produce a data report. The data report is then forwarded toward the sink node through multiple hops.
The sink has strong self-protection, computation and storage capabilities, and possesses all secret information of the network, including the keys, hash values and relative positions of nodes. Sink can filter out all false and outdated reports that finally transmitted to.
We also assume that the network has a short time period of safe bootstrapping after deployed, during this period each node is safe to distribute its information without being compromised.
b. Deployment and bootstrapping
There is a global secret pool G={K i :0≤ i ≤W -1}, and every node A i randomly selects a different key to store. In addition, we pre-assign each node a random data µ i and a one-way function £ which has the features of one-way and irreversible, i.e., for a given input parameter a, it is easy to calculate £(a)=b, but it is impossible to introduce a from b [15] .
Next, each node A i can produce a one-way hash chain according to steps as follows. First, Step 1: check up whether R including t node IDs, hash values, indexes and MACs.
Step 2: if not stored the neighbor information of A 1 , abandoning R.
Step 3: check up whether every node A 2 , … , A t are neighbors of A 1.
Step 4: if stored the key K v of certain node A v (1≤ v ≤ t) , calculates M again through K v and compares it to M v . if M is equal to M v ,abandoning R.
Step Step 6: if all of the above confirmations are successful, transmits R to the next hop. Fig. 3 illustrates the pseudo-code of filtering on forwarding. e. Example of en-route filtering
As illustrated in Fig.4 signifies that R isn't a package produced by the correct source node and also to abandon it accordingly.
Theorem 1: in the existing filtering schemes (e.g., SEF, REFS, MDSEF, RDFS, PCREF and so on ), assuming the attacker has compromised N c nodes randomly (N c ≥ t) in the network, then the probability for obtaining at least t different key partitions, can be denoted as,
Proof: commanding N c compromised nodes form a set Q 1 , the number of methods of selecting t partitions from n ones is C(n, t), and also these selected partitions form a set Q 2 . Next, the number of methods which set Q 2 form surjection to set Q 1 is,
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The number of methods that the attacker just obtains t key partitions after randomly compromising N c nodes in the network is C(n, t) × φ , similarly, we can calculate the number of methods that the attacker just obtains t +1, t +2,…, n key partitions, so the number of methods that the attacker obtaining more than t partitions is,
Obviously, the number of methods that each element in set Q 1 has an image in set Q 2 is n Nc .
Proved. In MOFS, in order to fake unrecognized false package, the attacker has to obtain more than t nodes, where some node A in it, making the other compromised nodes to be neighbors of A. For example, when t is equal to 5, after compromising A 6 and its neighbors A 7 ,…, A 10 in Fig. 5 , the adversary is able to fake a false package with the Cos A 6 and additional 5 correct MACs through A 6 ,…，A 10 , finally, all forwarding nodes and sink can't filter out the false package.
Therom2: assuming the attacker obtains N c (N c ≥ t) nodes in the network randomly, the probability that existing more than t such nodes (there is some node A, making the other t-1 nodes are all neighbors of A) is,
Here p(µ) is,
Proof: assuming that the area of the network is Z, and then every node has a probability πµ 2 / Z to distribute in the spherical zone M with a radius µ. Therefore, the probability of just existing t
. Therefore, the probability of obtaining more than t nodes in the certain zone with a radius of µ is p(µ).
Making event g signifies this: among y (t ≤ y ≤ N c ) nodes, there is some node A, whose distances between the other y -1 nodes are all less than the communication radius r c . Making event g 0 signifies this: y nodes belong to a same zone with a radius of r c /2. Making event g 1 signifies this: y nodes belong to a same zone with a radius of r c . Obviously, we can get g from g 0 , and also can get g 0 from g 1 . Proved. Fig. 6 draws the theoretical analysis curve and simulation result of p SEF and p MOFS , here t is set to 5, r c is 2.5 meters, n is equal to 15 and the network radius is set to 25 meters (simulation result is the average value from 2000 randomly tests under the same parameter settings). As is shown in Fig. 6 , after obtaining little nodes, the attacker is able to break down SEF in a higher probability.
However, in order to break down MOFS, it needs more compromised nodes. For example, when N c is equal to 20, the probability that the attacker breaking down SEF is 98.9%, for MOFS, the probability is 0.02%. Therefore, from theoretical analysis and experiment result analysis, we can know that the compromise tolerate ability of MOFS is far better than SEF. The probability that the false package is filtered within H hops is,
We then analyze the ability of filtering outdated data in MOFS. Assuming the compromised node A injects an outdated data R a into the network. Making the number of neighbor nodes of A is num(A), the number of hops from A to sink is c 0 , the number of hops from A i to sink is c i (1≤ i ≤   d) . Obviously, c i is equal to c 0 minus i .Therefore, the probability that the intermediate node A i can check up the hash value of one out of these t nodes in the outdated package is,
Since every forwarding node can filter R a with a probability p a_i , the probability that the outdated package being filtered within H hops is,
As is shown in Fig. 7 which draws the curves that both of outmoded package and false package changing according to the transmission hops H, (N d =3, c 0 = 20, num(S) =8，t =5). We can know from Fig. 7 , MOFS can filter outdated package and false package with a higher probability simultaneously. For example, the proportions those within the first 5 hops to filter outdated package and fake package are 96.3% and 64%, respectively. Along with the increasing of the transmission hops, the filtering proportion is getting bigger and bigger, (all outdated package is filtered in the first 8 hops, and about 95% of the false package is filtered in the first 20 hops). 
L r is 52.45bytes and 38.27bytes, respectively. Obviously, comparing to SEF, the extra load in data package of MOFS will lead to the increase of transmission energy, but given to the capability that MOFS is able to filter out false and outdated data, the extra expense above could be tolerated. In addition, if the attacker injects false and outdated data into the network, comparing to SEF, MOFS can save more energy through filtering them as soon as possible. And we will check up it in the partition of simulation experiment. The equation behind illustrates the expense of transmitting"1 false data + β outdated data" for H hops:
ii HH
d. Expense of storage
In MOFS, each node needs to store a pre-distributed key, a one-way hash chain with length u, all upstream nodes' neighbor information and keys and hash values for part of the upstream nodes.
For example, assuming a network with an area of 60×60m 2 , where randomly deploying 500 nodes whose radius are all 2.3m. Then the average number of neighbor nodes of a node is 7 and the average number of paths is 38. When the length of a key is 64bits, length of node ID is 10 bits, length of hash value is 64bits and the corresponding index is 19 bits, it requires a storage need of 2.1KB. As the mainstream nodes (e.g., the MICA2 node developed by UCB) equips more than 3 KB SRAM and 128KB ROM, and thus can meet the requirements obviously.
e. Simulation experiment
We build the simulated platform through C language, and the results are averaged from 10 simulation experiments. The simulation environment is as follows: in a 50×50m 2 square network area, randomly distributes 500 sensors, a static source node and a sink node are located in the sides of the area, respectively; the expense of transmitting and accepting data package of SEF is 60mW and 12mW respectively, and the expense of transmitting and accepting a MOFS data package is 81mW, 16mW, respectively; the communication radius and perception radius are 2.5m and 5m respectively.
As is shown in Fig. 8 , we can know the change of filtering probability along with the transmission hops H when the number of compromise nodes is 15. As is shown below:
(1)MOFS could filter false and outdated packages with higher probabilities, e.g., the filtering proportion in the first 5 hops of the formal reach 80.3% and 96.7% respectively; along with the increasing of transmission hops, the probability of filtering false and outdated packages also increase quickly, being able to filter all false package within 19 hops and filter all outdated packages within 6 hops.
(2) SEF can filter about 25% false packages in the first 5 hops , e.g., being able to filter about 70% false packages in the first 20 hops. Because data package in the MOFS is attached with hash values, and thus is able to filter the outdated packages through checking up the freshness of them.
However, SEF doesn't attach any "time variable parameters" in the data package, so can not filter the outdated packages. As is shown in Fig. 9 , we can know the change of data transmission expense along with the transmitting hops H when the number of compromise nodes N c is equal to 15. As is shown below:
(1) expense of SEF transmitting 100 false packages magnify with the increasing of transmitting hops, e.g., the expense of the first 7 transmitting hops is 3.34Joules and the expense of the first 20 transmitting hops is 9.48Joules; while at the same condition, the expense in the MOFS is much less, e.g., the expense of the first 6 transmitting hops is 1.49Joules, and after transmitting for 6 hops, the expense don't magnify any more because all false packages are filtered.
(2) The expense of SEF transmitting 100 outdated packages magnify with the increasing of transmitting hops. For example, when transmitting 20 hops, E is equal to 14.5Joules. However, at the same conditions, transmitting more than 6 hops, E is equal to 2.2Joules in the MOFS. 
